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Business-to-Business Internet Purchasing Exchanges: 







Ever since the emergence of the World Wide Web less than 
a decade ago, the Internet has been hailed as a technological 
innovation that held the potential to transform our society.1  
The recent economic slowdown and the accompanying fall off of 
the stock markets, however, have severely dampened 
enthusiasm for firms focused on developing Internet 
applications.2  Regardless of the fate of any individual Internet 
company, however, the Internet itself appears here to stay, and 
in the past few years a new Internet platform has emerged 
which allows multiple businesses to easily engage in commerce 
with each other in real time. The importance of these 
 
 1. See Jane Katz, Business-To-Business Use of the Internet is Slowly 
Transforming the Economy.  But there is No Frictionless Transition, REGIONAL 
REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON 2, (September 19, 2000) 
(“To the army of geeks and programmers who were [the Internet’s] early 
proponents, the new open technology seemed to offer limitless possibilities- 
borderless free markets, a close-to-costless way of making transactions, and a 
fluid and effortless medium for collaboration.”). 
 2. At least 210 Internet companies shuttered their doors in the year 
2000, and nearly 60% of the failures occurred in the fourth quarter of that 
year.  See Carol Sliwa, Facing Tough Rivals, eToys Nears Oblivion, 
COMPUTERWORLD 1 (January 8, 2000) <http://www.computerworld.com/cwi/ 
story/0,1199,NAV65-665_STO55934,00.html>.  Observing the demise of 
dot.coms has become something of a sport, with sections of some web sites 
devoted to the task.  See e.g., Upside (visited June 16, 2001) 
<http://www.upside.com/graveyard/>.  Each failed dot.com listed is 
accompanied by a quote from the firm, often taken from the defunct company’s 
web site.  See id.  Some of the more interesting comments include: “[s]ince 
we’re all seeking challenging new opportunities, please check out the resumes 
of our company’s talented employees.”  See TheMan (visited June 16, 2001) 
<http://www.theman.com>.  “Rome fell.  Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo.  
Knight Rider was pulled off the air.  Things end.”  See Free Scholarships 
(visited June 16, 2001) <http://www.freescholarships.com> (message posted in 
an attempt to explain its demise). 
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transactions, known in the trade as Business-to-Business, or 
B2B, transactions, may eventually come to dwarf the impact 
that the Internet has had on consumers.3 
In spite of the promises inherent in this new business 
model, B2B exchanges necessarily involve collaboration 
between competitors in a market, and thus raise potential 
antitrust concerns.  Because of the infancy of the B2B exchange 
model, little antitrust attention has been paid to these entities 
until recently. 
This Note proposes that the FTC exercise great caution in 
its approach to the regulation of B2B exchanges, but 
recommends that some additional steps be taken to ensure that 
these exchanges do not become a center of anticompetitive 
pricing behavior.  Part I examines in some detail the design 
and benefits of the B2B business model.  Part II lays out the 
FTC’s traditional framework in analyzing antitrust issues 
involving collaborations among competitors, of which B2B 
exchanges form a subset.  Part III critiques the FTC’s response 
to the antitrust issues raised by B2B exchanges and 
recommends that these exchanges be required to take steps to 
protect the confidentiality of data concerning buyers, sellers, 
and prices on the exchange. 
 
I.  THE PROMISES OF B2B INTERNET EXCHANGES 
 
A B2B electronic marketplace (exchange) consists 
essentially of a software package which enables buyers and 
sellers of one or more goods to transact with each other through 
the Internet.4  It is estimated that the total value of B2B e-
commerce will be $7.29 trillion dollars by 2004, of which 37% 
will consist of transactions taking place on B2B exchanges.5 
 
 3. Business purchases of goods and services amount to over 70% of the 
total sales in the economy.  See Katz, supra note 1, at 1 (citing Princeton 
economist Alan Blinder).  The change in the structure of the economy caused 
by the emergence of business-to-business commerce, therefore, may far exceed 
the changes wrought by the purchase of goods over the Internet by consumers.  
See id. 
 4. See Donald S. Clark, Notice of the Federal Trade Commission 
Announcing the Public Workshop on Competition Policy in the World of B2B 
Electronic Marketplaces (visited Apr. 9, 2001) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/ 
b2workshop.htm>. 
 5. See Comments Regarding B2B Electronic Marketplaces, Memorandum 
from Arthur B. Sculley & W. William A. Woods to the Federal Trade 
Commission Public Workshop on Competition Policy in the World of B2B 
Electronic Marketplaces.  Estimates of the current value of B2B sales in the 
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Since B2B electronic exchanges are a relatively recent 
innovation, the various business models utilized by the 
exchanges remain in rapid evolution.  The exchanges may be 
grouped into three main types, however.  The first and earliest 
model, and the most common overall, is the independent 
vertical exchange, in which an independent third party forms 
the exchange and brings buyers and sellers of certain goods 
within a specific industry together.6  The second type, and most 
popular model, is the buyer vertical exchange, in which the 
exchange is formed by a group of buyers in a given industry.7  A 
third type, designated as the horizontal model, is not limited to 
firms of any particular industry; rather, it seeks to serve any 
business that purchases or sells a given category of goods.8 
Regardless of which model a given B2B exchange 
represents, a variety of methods may be used to match orders 
between buyers and sellers.  A catalog system may consist of 
nothing more than the online grouping together of the sale 
catalogs of a number of suppliers in a given industry, for 
example auto parts.9  Such an arrangement allows a buyer, for 
example, an automaker, which is a member of the exchange, to 
quickly compare prices and other variables for a desired auto 
part among the different suppliers, thereby reducing the time 
and expense of gathering information from different suppliers 
offline. 
A B2B may also be organized around the dynamic pricing 
of goods.10 In a dynamic pricing format, the B2B exchange 
 
United States range from $50 billion and $150 billion, which would represent 
about 75% of the world’s B2B sales.  See id.  The wide variance in estimates is 
due in part to the lack of consensus on what constitutes a B2B sale, e.g., does 
it include a transaction that is initiated, but not completed, on the Internet?  
See Katz, supra note 1, at 2. 
 6. See Joel Simkins, Vice President of energyLeader.com,  
Comments regarding B2B Electronic Marketplaces (June 20-30, 2000) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/bc/b2b/comments/>.  Thus, for example, an independent 
vertical exchange may consist of a group of toy manufacturers, a group of toy 
wholesalers who purchase toys from the manufacturers, and a group of toy 
retailers who purchase toys from the wholesalers for ultimate resale to 
consumers. 
 7. See id. at 6. 
 8. For example, a horizontal exchange may be formed between makers 
(sellers) of various office supplies and businesses (buyers) of any industry in 
need of purchasing such goods. 
 9. See Entering the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the World of B2B 
Electronic Marketplaces: A Report By Federal Trade Commission Staff, Part 1 
at 8 (Oct., 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/10/index.htm#26>. 
 10. See Charles Phillips and Mary Meeker, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 
110 MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 2:107 
matches buyers and sellers in real time as bids and quotes are 
posted onto the system.11 
B2B’s may also function as auctions in which buyers bid to 
purchase goods offered for sale by sellers, or, alternatively, 
where buyers post orders for a specified good and suppliers bid 
for the right to supply the good.12  A twist on this model is a 
reverse auction, in which a supplier posts an item for sale, and 
buyers bid for the right to purchase the item. 
The motivating force behind the creation of B2B exchanges 
is the elimination of costs.  The initial efforts focused on 
reducing the transaction costs involved in procuring goods by, 
among other things, eliminating paper work and reducing 
errors in procurement.13  While these efforts remain perhaps 
the primary driving force behind B2B commerce, proponents of 
these exchanges have more recently begun to tout additional 
benefits that are expected to reduce costs at all stages of the 
supply chain.  For example, B2B exchanges are purported to 
reduce prices of goods by encouraging competition among 
 
The B2B Internet Report: Collaborative Commerce, 28 (April 2000) (visited 
April 9, 2001) <http://www.ftc.gov.bc/b2b/comments/msdw-b2breport.pdf>. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id.  Web-based auction sites such as ebay.com are similar to this 
format, except that they represent business-to-consumer (B2C) operations 
rather than business-to-business (B2B) ones.  See eBay (visited April 9, 2001) 
<http://www.ebay.com>. 
 13. See Jerry Jasinowski, President, National Association of 
Manufacturers, Testimony Delivered to the Federal Trade Commission 
Workshop on Electronic Marketplaces (visited April 9, 2001) 
<http://www.ftc.gov>.  As an example of the way B2B activities can cut 
transaction costs, consider the case of the Norfolk Southern Railway.  
Previously, each time the firm required the performance of repair work, a 
manager had to spend hours calling various construction firms for price 
quotes.  See Laura Cohn, et al., B2B: The Hottest Net Bet Yet? BUSINESSWEEK 
ONLINE 2 (January 17, 2000) <http://www.businessweek.com:/2000/00_03/ 
b3664065.htm?scriptFramed>.  Now, the manager simply puts the repair work 
up for bids on the RailNet-USA.com B2B exchange.  See id.  The process 
results in the reception of bids from a far greater number of firms than before, 
presumably resulting in more competitive bids, and frees up the manager to 
work on other projects.  See id.  Carrefour, a French consumer retailer, 
estimates that it has saved as much as thirty percent on its procurement of 
goods using the GlobalNetExchange B2B internet Exchange.  See Maria 
Seminerio, All Aboard for Private B2B Marketplaces—Business Exchanges 
With Controlled Memberships Are Gaining Popularity, EWEEK, 57 (Sept. 25, 
2000) <http://www.zdnet.com/eweek/stories/general/0,11011,2629589,00. 
html>.  At General Electric, which is implementing e-processes throughout the 
firm, chief information officer Gary M. Reiner estimates that purchases made 
offline, which typically cost GE fifty to two hundred dollars per transaction, 
cost only about one dollar if done online.  See id. at 3. 
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suppliers14 and increasing economies of scale.15 
In addition to reducing costs, some experts believe that 
B2B exchanges may have additional benefits, including 
encouraging the introduction of new products,16 leveling the 
 
 14. See id.  By collecting a number of suppliers together in a B2B 
exchange, buyers will be able to easily and quickly compare prices and terms 
among all suppliers, forcing them to compete on price for their business.  See 
William Holstein, B2B is Rewriting the “Old Economy”, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (April 10, 2000) <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/00410/b2b.htm>.  
Under these circumstances, the resulting competitive market eliminates the 
ability of a supplier to set prices.  See id. at 5 (quoting Kannan Srinivasan, 
management and information-systems professor at Carnegie Mellon, as 
stating that “[t]he good news is that if you’re a manufacturer, you can get 
suppliers to compete against each other . . . but if you’re a supplier and you’re 
not the most efficient one, this is a serious threat to you.”).  The danger to 
suppliers is most acute if their products are “commoditized," i.e., 
indistinguishable from those of competitors.  See id. 
 15. See id.  A firm’s total costs are equal to its fixed costs of production 
(such as overhead, land, and factories) plus its variable costs of production, 
which includes such things as the price of the components used to produce the 
goods.  See id.  As the number of goods produced increases, the variable costs 
increase accordingly, but the fixed costs remain stable up till the point where 
the firm is at maximum production.  See id.  Hence, a firm’s total cost per unit 
of produced goods decreases as more goods are produced.  See id.  This 
principle produces a distinct advantage for firms which sell to larger, more 
dense markets, since the larger demand for the firm’s goods allows the firm to 
increase its production and thereby reduce its costs per unit of output.  See id.  
A firm serving a small, unconcentrated market, however, can reduce or 
eliminate this advantage by participating in a B2B exchange.  See id.  For the 
cost of setting up a Web site, the firm can potentially expand its market to 
include buyers from around the globe, enabling it to produce efficiencies of 
scale rivaling that of its larger competitors.  See id.  The ability to carry on 
transactions at lower prices, and to produce goods at a lower cost per unit of 
output, leads to a higher total output of goods and services in an economy.  See 
id.  This result stems from the fact that as prices decline, the average inflation 
rate decreases.  See id.  Hence, a higher lever of GDP results, since real GDP 
is equal to the nominal GDP minus inflation.  See id. 
 16. See Katz, supra note 1, at 3.  The theory is that as a membership in a 
B2B exchange increases a firm’s market, a large enough customer base could 
exist for a niche product that would previously have been unprofitable, and 
therefore never produced.  See id. 
The niche products manufactured as a result of the existence of B2B 
exchanges may even include goods custom built to meet the needs of the 
buyer.  The benefit of custom-made products need not be limited to business-
to-business transactions either.  At least one dot.com, Toybuilders.com, 
promises to produce custom made toys for consumers who visit its web site.  
See Toybuilders (visited June 16, 2001) <http://www.Toybuilders.com>.  The 
process involves the consumer filling out an online questionnaire defining the 
parameters of the desired toy.  See id.  The consumer is then given a price 
quote within 24 hours, and if accepted, the company will forward formal 
“eDrawings” of the proposed product to the consumer via email for final 
approval.  See id.  Examples of possible toys include, upon submission of 
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playing field for smaller competitors,17 and even reducing the 
risk of an economic recession.18 
The importance of B2B’s in maintaining economic growth 
in today’s disinflationary economy is potentially staggering.  
Under current economic conditions, firms experience difficulty 
in raising prices to increase profits or absorbing increases in 
the costs of labor or raw materials.  In this context, the 
existence of B2B’s provides an attractive, alternative route to 
enhance profitability through the reduction of transactional 
costs as opposed to raising prices,19 as well as reducing the risk 
to the financial health of the firm caused by excessive inventory 
levels during periods of economic contraction.  One recent 
Goldman Sachs study concludes that the growth of electronic 
B2B commerce will eventually increase the economic growth of 








personal photographs, action figures bearing the likeness of the purchaser.  
See id.  “The only limiting factor here is literally your imagination!” boasts the 
website.  Id. 
 17. See Jasinowski, supra note 13. 
 18. See id.  The smoothing out of the business cycle is attributable to the 
claim that B2B’s will improve a firm’s ability to manage its inventory.  See id.  
Inappropriately large inventory levels can aggravate or even cause an 
economic downturn.  A firm with a large inventory will respond to a decrease 
in consumer demand for its goods by cutting back production.  See id.  The 
resulting deleterious effect of reducing production, such as the layoff of 
workers, can lead to a vicious circle in which consumer demand is further 
reduced by the lowered buying power of the unemployed workers, causing 
further reductions in production at other firms.  This downward spiral can 
cause an economy to enter a period of overall contraction.  See id. 
 19. See, e.g., Denver Management Group, E-Business or Out of Business 
(visited April 9, 2001) <http://www.denvermanagement.com/ebizout.htm> 
(quoting Thomas Carpenter, managing director of ASB Capital Management, 
Inc., as saying “[t]he Internet represents the most powerful engine of deflation 
in the modern era.”).  At least one analyst has predicted that the Internet will 
cut the cost of producing a car by 14%, or about $3,650.00.  See Andrew Cassel, 
E-commerce in Infancy: Internet Trade Could Make Purchases Faster, Cheaper 
for Consumers, Businesses, DETROIT FREE PRESS (May 22, 2000) 
<http://www.freep.com/money/business/eecon22_20000522.htm>. 
 20. See id. at 3.  Since the U.S. GDP is presently about $9 trillion per 
year, a 0.25% increase in growth would produce an extra $23 billion in goods 
and services in the first year alone.  See id. 
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II.  COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS AND ANTITRUST 
LAW 
 
Despite their inherent promise, B2B exchanges may, by 
their very nature, induce antitrust concerns on the part of the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  Antitrust issues arise 
because B2B exchanges involve groups of competitors in a 
given industry joining a single forum in which information on 
buying and selling patterns may be exchanged between them. 
Because the emergence of B2B exchanges is a very recent 
occurrence, little has been published in the literature on the 
antitrust issues raised by these exchanges.21  Furthermore, the 
FTC has not yet formulated any regulations specifically 
tailored to B2B entities.  However, the following discussion is a 
description of how the FTC has approached analogous entities 
in the past. 
 
A.  THE FTC APPROACH TO ANTITRUST ISSUES 
 
Business-to-business marketplaces are generally regarded 
as being similar to joint ventures.22  In April 2000, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) issued guidelines (“Antitrust Guidelines”)23 explaining 
how these two federal agencies analyze the legality of 
competitor collaborations24 under antitrust law.  The FTC and 
DOJ utilize one of two types of analysis used by the U.S. 
Supreme Court when scrutinizing competitor collaborations: 





 21. A January 2001 Lexis search of combined law reviews produced 17 
journal articles mentioning B2B.  Of these, none focused on antitrust issues. 
 22. See FTC Enforcers Believe B2B Auctions Are Similar to JVs, FTC 
WATCH, Apr. 10, 2000. 
 23. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (April 
2000). 
 24. A “competitor collaboration” is defined as “a set of one or more 
agreements, other than merger agreements, between or among competitors to 
engage in economic activity, and the economic activity resulting therefrom.”  
Id. at 2. 
 25. See National Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 
(1978). 
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1.  The Per Se Illegal Rule 
 
A collaborative agreement26 that nearly always tends to 
raise prices or reduce output is usually held to be illegal per 
se.27  An illegal per se collaboration usually involves an 
agreement not to compete on price or output, and encompasses 
agreements “to fix prices or output, rig bids, or share or divide 
markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories or lines 
of commerce.” 28  Such agreements are presumed illegal without 
any inquiry to the actual competitive effects or claimed 
business purposes of the agreement.29  Even an otherwise per se 
illegal agreement, however, may overcome a presumption of 
illegality if the agreement results in an efficiency-enhancing 
integration of economic activity which is reasonably related to 
the agreement, and is reasonably necessary to achieve 
procompetitive benefits.30 
 
2.  The Rule of Reason 
 
Any agreement not presumed illegal under the per se rule 
is analyzed under the rule of reason, wherein the 
collaboration’s procompetitive benefits are weighed against its 
anticompetitive benefits to determine the overall effect on 
competition.31  The rule of reason analysis involves comparing 
 
 26. To qualify as a collaboration, there must be an agreement between 
competitors to engage in economic activity.  See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, 
supra note 23, at 2.  The definition implies a “meeting of the minds” or a 
“conscious commitment to a common scheme.”  See Jonathan B. Baker, 
Identifying Horizontal Price Fixing in the Electronic Marketplace, 65 
ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1996); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 
752, 764 n.9 (1984) (stating that to prove a meeting of the minds, “evidence 
must be documented both that the distributor communicated its acquiescence 
or agreement, and that this was sought by the manufacturer.”). 
 27. See California Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
 28. See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at 8. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 339 n.7, 
356-57 (1982).  An agreement need not be essential in order to be reasonably 
necessary.  See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at 9.  The central issue 
in establishing reasonable necessity is whether or not the collaborators could 
obtain a comparable efficiency through practical, significantly less restrictive 
means.  See Maricopa County Medical Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 352-53 (stating that 
even though establishing a maximum fee for a physician’s service was 
beneficial, it was not necessary for physicians to create the schedule 
themselves as opposed to insurers). 
 31. See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at 10. 
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the level of competition under the agreement with the 
competition level that would occur without the agreement.32  A 
harm to competition is established if an agreement would likely 
raise prices or reduce output, quality, service, or innovation 
below what would likely occur without the agreement taking 
place.33 
If it is determined that an agreement evidences by its very 
nature a likely competitive harm,34 or if anticompetitive harm 
has already occurred,35 the FTC or DOJ will challenge the 
agreement without further analysis unless other benefits exist 
which could offset the harm to competition.36  If, however, it is 
found that a potential anticompetitive effect exists, yet such 
harm either has not yet occurred or is not evident by the nature 
of the agreement, a detailed market analysis of the agreement 
is commenced.37  Such an analysis entails studying any factor 
which may increase or decrease competitive harms, including 
the market shares held by the collaborators, the ability and 
incentive of the collaborators to compete independently from 
each other,38 and whether barriers to entry exist which would 
deter new competitors from entering the market.39  Clauses in a 
collaborative agreement which may lead to a conclusion that an 
anticompetitive effect exists include those which limit the 
ability of a collaborator to make independent decisions,40 
 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See California Dental Ass’n at 1612-13, 1617. 
 35. See F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (declaring 
that “proof of actual detrimental effects” makes an inquiry into market power 
unnecessary). 
 36. See id. at 460-61. 
 37. See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at 11. 
 38. See id. 
 39. A collaboration will not be challenged if the barrier to entry for 
potential competitors is small enough such that their entry into the market 
would be timely, likely and sufficient to deter the anticompetitive harm.  See 
id. at 22.  The likelihood of entry is determined based upon whether potential 
competitors possess the competency and incentives necessary to enter the 
field.  See id. 
 40. Such collaborations may take a variety of different forms.  Production 
collaborations involve an agreement to jointly produce a product for sale in 
order to produce a good more efficiently.  See id. at 13.  Though production 
collaborations may be procompetitive in the sense that consumers may obtain 
the good at a lower price, they may also have anticompetitive effects if they 
involve an agreement on the amount of product produced, or the price at 
which it is sold.  See id.  Marketing collaborations are those in which the 
participants agree to jointly “sell, distribute, or promote goods or services that 
are either jointly or individually produced.”  Id. at 14.  A production 
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combine control over production, key assets, or decisions on 
price, output, or other factors sensitive to competition, or may 
cause an increase in market power.41 
If the detailed market analysis does not reveal potentially 
anticompetitive effects, the investigation is ended.42  If 
anticompetitive effects are found, however, an analysis is 
undertaken to determine whether the agreement is “necessary 
to achieve procompetitive benefits that likely would offset 
anticompetitive harms."43 
Of particular interest to an antitrust analysis of B2B 
exchanges are agreements which involve the exchange of 
sensitive information among the parties, since the sharing of 
information may lead to collusions on price or output.44  Of 
 
agreement may be procompetitive if it results in a faster and more efficient 
distribution of the product to the marketplace.  See id.  It may be 
anticompetitive, however, if it results in the fixing of a competitively 
significant variable, such as an agreement to jointly promote a product by 
eliminating comparative advertising in a manner which would restrict the 
information consumers receive concerning the product.  See id.  A buying 
collaboration involves an agreement to jointly purchase inputs.  See id.  Such a 
collaboration may be procompetitive by reducing costs through centralization 
of ordering or combining warehouse functions.  See id.  An anticompetitive 
effect may prevail, however, if the agreement enables the buyers to purchase 
the input at a price below that which would prevail without the agreement.  
See id.  A collaboration may also take the form of an agreement to practice 
joint research and development (R&D).  Such an agreement is procompetitive 
in that it can enable more efficient development of new goods or services.  See 
id.  It may be anticompetitive, however, if it reduces the amount of innovation 
that would have occurred if each participant in the agreement had conducted 
R&D separately.  See id. 
 41. Market power is defined as a seller’s ability to profitably keep prices 
above competitive levels for a significant time, or alternatively, as a buyer’s 
ability to profitably reduce the price of a product below the competitive level 
for a significant time.  See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at n. 30. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. at 12. 
 44. See id. at 15.  A recent example of alleged online collusion between 
competitors over price involved the nation’s airlines.  In U.S. v. Airline Tariff 
Publishing Co., Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 
58 FR 3971 (1993), the defendant Airline Tariff Publishing Co. (“ATP”), was 
owned by seven of the nation’s major airlines and served as the “central source 
for the collection, organization, and dissemination of fare information for 
virtually every domestic airline.”  Id. at 3975.  ATP operated a computerized 
fare system which disseminated to each airline information on the fares 
charged on every route served by every other airline.  See id.  Each weekday, 
airlines submitted a list of proposed changes which it wished to make to its 
fares.  See id.  Attached to each proposed fare change was a “first ticket date” 
representing the date on which the fare change was scheduled to become 
effective.  See id.  Also, attached to each fare currently offered for sale was a 
“second ticket date” which indicated the date at which the listed price was 
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special concern is the sharing of information concerning prices, 
output, costs, strategic planning, current and future business 
plans, or the sharing of the individual, as opposed to 






scheduled to expire.  See id.  Both the first and second ticket dates were 
tentative and could be changed or eliminated at any time; thus, a proposed 
fare change may be repeatedly delayed by changing the first ticket date to a 
time further and further in the future, or may never take place at all if 
withdrawn by the airline.  See id.  Hence, by accessing the ATP system, the 
airlines could monitor each other’s proposed fare changes and analyze them to 
discern any patterns.  See id.  The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) sued 
ATP and the participating airlines, alleging that the ATP system was a per se 
illegal price fixing agreement in that the airlines used the ATP system to 
illegally form agreements to fix prices, eliminate discounted fares, and set fare 
restrictions.  See id.  In particular, DOJ charged that the use of  “first ticket 
dates” amounted to a communication of a desire to increase fares on a selected 
route to which competing airlines could agree to or, alternatively, to submit an 
alternative plan.  See id.  For example, Carrier A could propose to increase a 
given fare by filing the change with ATP with a first ticket date two weeks in 
the future.  See id. at 3976.  Carrier B could then signal its approval of the 
price hike by filing a similar fare change on the same route, with a first ticket 
date matching that of the change proposed by Carrier A.  See id.  
Alternatively, a process of negotiation could ensue in which Carrier A would 
agree only to a smaller increase than proposed by Carrier A.  See id.  The 
negotiating process ended only after all airlines filed the same fare in the 
same market with the same first ticket, thus indicating their commitment to 
the fare hike.  See id.  Until all airlines agreed to the higher price, Carrier A 
could repeatedly postpone the first ticket date on the targeted flight to prevent 
the fare from taking effect until all competing airlines were onboard.  See id.  
The process serves as a way, therefore, for Carrier A to test out a proposed 
fare change without it actually taking effect until it knows that other airlines 
will agree to match it.  See id. 
A second example of alleged price collusion involving electronic interactions 
between competitors concerns the NASDAQ computerized stock quotation 
system.  The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) sued major NASDAQ securities 
firms which acted as “marketmakers” by trading in particular NASDAQ 
stocks.  See Second Amended Refiled Consolidated Complaint of the DOJ v. 
NASDAQ Marketmakers, (S.D.N.Y).  The DOJ charged that the 
marketmakers conspired to maintain the spreads (the difference between the 
“bid” price and the “ask” price) paid by securities buyers and sellers at supra-
competitive prices by refusing to quote bid and ask prices in odd-eighths (e.g., 
1/8, 3/8, 5/8) and instead widening the spread to even eighths (e.g., 2/8, 4/8, 
6/8).  See id. at 14.  Marketmakers allegedly punished those firms that refused 
to participate and “broke the spread” by refusing to conduct business with 
those firms in other contexts, trading around a marketmaker who broke the 
spread, and making threatening phone calls to them demanding that they fall 
into line.  See id. at 14-15. 
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B. SAFETY ZONES 
 
The FTC and DOJ have established “safety zones” which 
describe situations in which a collaboration agreement will be 
presumed lawful.46  First, a collaboration will generally not be 
challenged when the market shares of the collaboration and its 
members equal no more than twenty percent of the market in 
which competition may be affected.47  Second, a collaboration is 
presumed lawful if at least three other independently 
controlled research efforts have the assets, incentive, and other 
traits necessary to engage in R&D very similar to that of the 
collaboration. 48 
 
C. THE POTENTIAL ANTITRUST DANGERS INHERENT IN B2B 
 EXCHANGES 
 
1.  Monopsony 
 
B2B exchanges hold the potential to create a “once in a 
lifetime shift” in power from suppliers to buyers.49  One way in 
which buyers in an exchange may seek to reduce their costs is 
by pooling their purchase orders for a given good together, and 
using the resulting size of the order to negotiate a volume 
discount with a seller.50  The danger, however, is that the 
purchasers may be able to exercise monopsony power by 
ganging up on the seller and forcing it to sell the product at a 
price that is below that which would normally prevail in a 
competitive market.51 
 
 46. See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at 26. 
 47. See id. This safety zone does not apply to agreements which are per se 
illegal, or that would be challenged even without the undertaking of a detailed 
market analysis.  See id. 
 48. See id. at 26-27.  This safety zone also does not apply to per se illegal 
agreements, or those challenged without a detailed market analysis.  See id. 
 49. See Comments by Rick Warren-Boulton, TRANSCRIPTS OF THE 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PUBLIC WORKSHOP: COMPETITION POLICY IN 
THE WORLD OF B2B ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACES (visited April 9, 2001) 
<http://www.ftc.gov>. 
 50. See id. 
 51. It is important to distinguish illegal monopsony power from regular 
bargaining power.  Both types of behavior result in the purchaser paying a 
lower price for goods.  A monopsonist, however, achieves that result by 
reducing demand for the goods by restricting its level of purchases to an extent 
sufficient to force the seller to reduce the price in order to unload the goods.  
The reduction in demand then typically leads the seller to curtail production of 
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The danger of monopsony is most present in B2B 
exchanges where there is a small group of purchasers who 
account for a large portion of the market for a specialized 
good.52  In such a case, the seller will feel compelled to deal with 
the buyers on their terms; if, however, the market for the good 
is large and fragmented, the seller has the negotiating leverage 
to “walk away” from the table and instead deal with other 
groups of buyers outside of the exchange. 
 
2.  Price Fixing Through Information Exchange 
 
A second antitrust risk associated with B2B exchanges 
stems from the fact that the Internet allows for the aggregation 
and analysis of copious information concerning the exchange’s 
participants.  For example, in some B2B exchanges, 
participants may be allowed to track the identities of each 
buyer and seller, as well as the amount of a good purchased 
and the date and time, and price of the transaction.53 In a 
model of perfect competition, where there is complete 
transparency of all information to all participants in the 
market, the availability of such information enhances buyer 
choices and leads to increased competition between buyers and 
sellers.54  In some circumstances, however, greater exchange of 
information can actually result in reduced competition and 
higher prices to consumers.55  Specifically, one danger in a B2B 
exchange is that if all of the buyers know the prices that their 
competitors are paying for their production inputs, they may be 
able to predict the prices the competitors will charge to 
consumers.56  Such knowledge may create conditions in which 
 
the goods, thereby reducing overall output.  In turn, the reduction in the final 
output of goods available for purchase by consumers tends to increase the 
retail price of the goods.  Regular buying power, in contrast, involves a buyer 
utilizing the particular strengths in its bargaining position to negotiate a 
better price with the seller.  Usually, the resulting lower price encourages the 
buyer to purchase the goods in greater quantity, thus increasing the total 
amount of goods available for purchase by the consumer, and therefore 
lowering the retail price. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See Charles F. Rule, B2B or Collusion, 36 LEGAL TIMES (April 3, 
2000). 
 54. See Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Horizontal Price Fixing in the 
Electronic Marketplace, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1996). 
 55. See id at 42. 
 56. See Peter L. de la Cruz & Sheila A. Millar, Comments Regarding B2B 
Electronic Marketplaces (June 28, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/bc/b2b/comments 
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the participants could tacitly collude on prices charged at 
retail.57  Furthermore, this same transparency of information 
could lead to tacit allocation of markets.58  If a company can 
discern through the price inputs of its competitor that it is less 
competitive in a given market, it may shift its resources out of 
that market and into one in which it is more competitive.59 
 
3.  Exclusion 
 
A third antitrust danger lies in the possibility of excluding 
certain buyers and/or sellers from participating in an exchange 
or holding equity in it.  For example, a B2B exchange might 
require all buyer participants to purchase a certain percentage 
of their goods through the exchange, or even prohibit them 
entirely from making purchases through any other exchange.  
Alternatively, a supplier-owned exchange could implement 
rules making it difficult for any additional suppliers to join the 
 
/kellerandheckman.pdf>. 
 57. Imagine, for example, that Company A is a manufacturer of a new 
consumer video game system.  As a member of a B2B purchasing exchange, 
company A purchases on a certain date a quantity of memory chips which are 
essential components of its product.  Shortly thereafter, an earthquake 
severely damages several South Korean factories which produce the memory 
chips, causing the price of such chips to skyrocket.  Company B, Company A’s 
main competitor, is finalizing the production of a new video game system just 
in time for the holiday shopping season to compete with Company A’s product.  
Company B is forced to purchase its memory chips on the exchange at the 
higher post-earthquake price.  Company A, as a participant on the exchange, 
notes Company B’s purchase and infers that Company B will be forced to price 
its new product at a higher level due to the increased cost of the chip.  
Company A then raises the price of its product over that which it would have 
priced it without knowledge of the price of Company B’s production inputs. 
 58. See The Original Equipment Suppliers Association, Comments 
Prepared for the Federal Trade Commission In Connection With Its Workshop 
on Competition Policy in the World of B2B Electronic Marketplaces at 3 (June 
29, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/bc/b2b/comments/oesa.pdf>. 
 59. See id.  Generally, this process is not harmful, and in fact is the heart 
of the competitive process.  See id.  However, outside of a transparent 
marketplace, a company can never know for sure where its competitor’s 
strengths and weaknesses are.  See id.  Therefore, the company will be forced 
to make its choices on what is competitively optimal, and not based on what 
its competitor’s position is.  See id.  In a B2B online exchange that is 
transparent concerning the identities of buyers and sellers, however, no 
uncertainty remains, since each competitor knows the quantity of goods 
purchased and at what price by each competitor.  See id.  Thus, the 
competitors will allocate their resources based on the actions of their 
competitors, instead of responding to the demands of the market.  See id.  This 
allocation results in a collusive situation in which the well-being of the 
participants is enhanced at the expense of that of the end consumer.  See id. 
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exchange.60  If most of the buyers in that industry purchase 
exclusively through the B2B exchange, the suppliers not 
allowed to join would find themselves completely shut out of 
the market.61 
Furthermore, if a B2B exchange is run as a for-profit entity 
which charges participants for each transaction carried out on 
the exchange, those buyers (or sellers) which are equity owners 
in the exchange would receive their respective shares of any 
profits, wherein the profits would essentially serve as a rebate 
on the fees which were charged to the equity owners on their 
own transactions.62  Thus, their transaction costs would be 
effectively lowered relative to that of any non-equity 
competitors who participate in the exchange, giving them a 
competitive advantage.63 
 
III. CRITIQUING THE FTC'S RESPONSE TO THE PUBLIC 
WORKSHOP ON B2B ELECTRONIC 
MARKETPLACES 
 
At issue in this Note is whether the guidelines for joint 
venture agreements described above are adequate to police the 
emerging sector of business-to-business online marketplaces.  
An analysis of this issue may lead to several different 
conclusions, including that: B2B marketplaces should be 
regulated as joint ventures under already existent joint venture 
antitrust guidelines; new regulations are required which 
specifically address the unique issues which are generated by 
 
 60. If the owners of the exchange are larger companies, an easy way to 
increase the barrier of entry into the exchange is to set the transaction fees 
high enough to make it unfeasible for smaller firms to participate.  Thus, even 
if the exchange owners maintain ostensibly objective criteria for joining the 
exchange, the rules in fact may be designed to keep out potential competitors. 
A second way to keep out competitors lies in the software technologies 
necessary to interact with participants in the exchange.  Typically, the 
exchange establishes a uniform set of variables and Internet locations which 
the computerized systems of each participant must be able to read and write.  
See id.  An exchange may deny access to this information to an unwanted 
potential participant, thus depriving it of the ability to fully make use of the 
exchange.  See id. 
 61. Fears about exclusion may no longer be merely theoretical.  Already 
some complaints about exclusionary practices have arisen.  See Julia King, 
Some Dispute FTC Finding In B2B Antitrust Report, COMPUTER WORLD (Nov. 
6, 2000). 
 62. See Albert A. Foer, High Tech Needs Antitrust, FTC WATCH No. 546 
(June 5, 2000).  This technique is known as “raising rival’s costs.”  See id. 
 63. See id. 
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B2B marketplaces; or that no regulation of B2B exchanges by 
the FTC or DOJ should take place at this early stage in their 
development.64 
On June 29, 2000, the FTC held a public workshop on B2B 
exchanges, bringing together designers, owners, operators, and 
members of these entities to discuss their benefits as well as 
the possible antitrust dangers which could arise.65  On October 
26, 2000, this workshop culminated in the release by the FTC 
of a report setting forth guideposts to use in evaluating 
antitrust concerns in the context of B2B exchanges.66 
There is some evidence that a general consensus is forming 
that the FTC’s present guidelines governing collaborations 
among competitors provide a sufficient framework to address 
the antitrust issues arising out of Internet B2B exchanges.67  
After all, the potential risks inherent to B2B’s such as price 
fixing, exclusion, and monopsony are the same which crop up in 
other traditional antitrust cases.  Nevertheless, controversy 
exists as to how (and when) the FTC’s collaboration guidelines 
 
 64. A hands-off, laissez-faire approach to B2B’s is grounded in the belief 
that proper market incentives already exist to ensure that B2B’s do not 
operate in an anticompetitive manner.  See supra note 117 and accompanying 
text.  Easterbrook and Fischel provide a classic example of an argument that 
government regulations are not necessary to ensure the proper functioning of 
markets in a different context.  See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 
Mandatory Disclosure & the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984) 
(arguing that mandatory securities disclosure laws are superfluous). 
 65. See Federal Trade Commission, FTC to Hold Public Workshop to 
Examine Competition Issues in Business-to-Business Electronic Marketplaces 
(May 4, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/05/b2bworkshoop.htm>. 
 66. See Entering the 21st Century, supra note 9.  This report, however, 
merely represents the views of the FTC staff, and are not necessarily those of 
the Commission as a whole.  See id. at n.1. 
 67. See, e.g. Jasinowski supra note 13 (arguing that there is no need at 
the present time “for specific rules concerning this sector”); Philip A. Proger, 
Testimony to the Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Electronic 
Marketplaces (2000) <http://www.ftc.gov> (visited April 9, 2001) (stating that 
“[I]’m sort of skeptical that there is anything highly unusual about B2B’s, . . . 
they may be very, very pro competitive, but in the end we’re going to have to 
do traditional antitrust analysis, and I think the joint venture analysis and 
the Collaboration Guidelines are appropriate in this framework.”); Laura A. 
Wilkinson, Testimony to the Federal Trade Commission Workshop on 
Electronic Marketplaces (2000) <http://www.ftc.gov> (visited April 9, 
2001)(arguing that “the antitrust laws and guidelines that we have in place in 
terms of mergers and joint ventures or collaborations among competitors all 
take in to effect [B2B’s] as well so I think that as the dust settles, you’ll find 
that the analysis remains the same, and the issues remain the same in terms 
of monopoly, monopsony, collusion and information exchange kinds of 
issues.”). 
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should be applied to B2B’s.  An analysis of these issues 
suggests that while the FTC should exercise great caution in 
promulgating new regulations which could have a chilling 
effect on the nascent B2B industry, some steps must be taken 
to specifically address the potential problems arising from 
information sharing between competitors on a B2B electronic 
marketplace. 
 
A. PREVENTING MONOPSONY 
 
One way in which buyers may engage in monopsonistic 
behavior is by limiting the number of suppliers allowed onto 
the exchange.  This danger is most apparent in the minority of 
industries which are non-fragmented; that is, those which are 
dominated by a small number of larger purchasers.68  
Monopsony can also occur where the buyers, acting in concert, 
restrict their purchases to force the sellers to reduce prices to 
make a sale. 
A telltale sign of monopsonistic behavior of the second type 
is a requirement by the exchange that each member must deal 
exclusively with the exchange.69  This telltale behavior occurs 
because by restricting purchases to drive down the price, each 
purchaser will find itself unable to obtain as many goods as in a 
non-monopsonistic situation.70  The purchasers will therefore 
have an incentive to buy additional goods outside of the 
exchange, thereby providing an incentive for the exchange to 
restrict a buyer’s purchases outside of the exchange.71 
The Competition Policy Report does not provide any 
framework specifically tailored to B2B’s for determining if 
monopsonistic practices exist.  The Report notes, however, that 
under the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, whether or not 
the exercise of monopsonistic power would induce the entry of 
 
 68. The danger of monopsony is generally only present in B2B exchanges 
featuring dynamic pricing, such as a “reverse auction” where the sellers bid to 
provide for the buyer’s requirement, or some other mechanism wherein the 
price between buyer and seller is negotiated.  Most exchanges to date, 
however, involve “static pricing,” where each seller’s catalog is online with a 
fixed price for each item.  There is therefore no opportunity for the buyers to 
“gang up” on the sellers to force them to reduce prices. 
 69. See Entering the 21st Century, supra note 9, at Part 3, 14 (noting that 
“[e]xclusivity policies that require that the group’s members purchase through 
the group may make the exercise of monopsony power easier”). 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. 
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new buyers onto the exchange to mitigate the monopsonistic 
effects is a relevant consideration in determining if a B2B is in 
violation of antitrust laws.72 
Additionally, participants at the Public Workshop put 
forward various regulations whose enactment could help 
prevent the development of monopsonistic practices.  For 
example, the FTC could prohibit B2B’s from requiring their 
members to refrain from making purchases outside of the 
exchange.73 Such a rule, however, could backfire by preventing 
many legitimate B2B’s from generating the profits necessary 
for their survival.74  Many of the B2B’s formed thus far have 
been created by a small number of major industry players,75 
suggesting that B2B exchanges require a certain minimum 
volume of purchases through the exchange in order to generate 
sufficient revenue to run the exchange, as well as to provide 
enough business on the exchange to encourage a sufficient 
number of sellers to participate.76 
Prohibiting a B2B from enacting restrictions on its 
members could discourage the formation of B2B exchanges.  In 
sum, the imposition of new regulations on B2B exchanges 
designed to prevent monopsonistic practices may end up 
causing more harm than they prevent, and therefore the FTC 
should refrain from promulgating new regulations addressing 
these dangers until the B2B industry reaches the level of 
maturity necessary to establish what regulations may be 
needed to reasonably address these concerns, while not unduly 
harming the ability of B2B’s to operate. 
In the future, the Competition Policy Report’s emphasis on 
the ability of monopsonistic practices to induce new buyers onto 
the exchange77 may prove useful as a starting point for 
enforcing antitrust laws with respect to B2B’s and monopsony.  
The lack of such inducement can serve as a signal that any 
benefits derived from limiting participants’ abilities to transact 
outside of the B2B exchange are outweighed by considerations 
of preventing the occurrence of anti-competitive practices. 
 
 72. See id. at Part 3, 15. 
 73. See Robert E. Bloch & Scott P. Perlman, 
 Analysis of Antitrust Issues Raised By B2B Exchanges (visited June 16, 2000) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/bc/b2b/comments/blockarticle.pdf>.  This proposal is also 
relevant to the discussion on exclusion in Part II B of this Note. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
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Additionally, the FTC should strongly encourage B2B’s to 
form an independent, third party body to ensure that fair, 
objective standards are employed in determining which entities 
are allowed onto the B2B.  This can be accomplished by making 
it clear that the existence of such an independent body, 
especially in the case of B2B’s in highly fragmented industries, 
will be considered as relevant evidence of compliance with the 
antitrust laws in any investigation of possible monopsonistic 
practices. 
 
B.  PREVENTING UNLAWFUL EXCLUSION 
 
In tackling the issue of anticompetitive exclusions of 
participants from a B2B exchange, the Competition Policy 
Report again relies on the standard rule of reason analysis.  
Hence, the Report asks if the exclusion of a given firm from a 
B2B exchange is likely to result in anticompetitive harm.78  
Next, it is determined whether the denial of access is 
reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits that 
likely offset the anticompetitive harm.79  The report notes that 
key factors may shape the analysis, including considerations of 
whether the B2B is the only way the product can be bought or 
sold at reasonable prices, whether the barrier of entry to the 
creation of a new B2B to compete with the exclusionary one is 
sufficiently low, and whether the denial of access to a new 
member gives the existing members of a B2B the power to 
maintain prices of products above that which would otherwise 
prevail.80 
Rather than relying on this traditional antitrust analysis, 
some have promoted further steps to ensure fairness and 
inclusionary practices on B2B exchanges.  It has been 
suggested that each B2B exchange should develop objective 
criteria by which a new buyer or seller will be admitted. 81 It is 
argued that the absence of an independent body to establish 
standards for the exchange and evaluate admission to the 
exchange should be treated as a potentially anticompetitive 
behavior under an antitrust analysis.82 
 
 78. See Entering the 21st Century, supra note 9, at Part 3, 20. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. at 20-22. 
 81. See, e.g., The Original Equipment Suppliers’ Association, supra note 
58, at 7. 
 82. See id. 
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Another possible rule would require B2B’s to have an open 
exchange wherein any entity which could meet reasonable, 
objective criteria would be admitted.  Such a rule is unwise, 
however, because valid reasons may exist for a B2B to exclude 
additional members.  For example, to be profitable and 
effective, a B2B must be able to assure buyers, who may be 
purchasing items in a blind auction without knowing the 
identities of the suppliers, that the suppliers are trustworthy 
and capable of delivering goods to the buyer’s specifications.83  
Thus, some buyers may wish to form a B2B exchange whose 
membership is limited to those suppliers it has worked with in 
the past and found trustworthy.84 At this early stage in B2B 
development, it is difficult to see how the FTC could have a 
firm enough grasp of when exclusion is or is not necessary to 
the successful functioning of a B2B.  In fact, the current 
relative dearth of B2B’s which practice exclusionary tactics 
suggests that little incentive to exclude may exist except in 
situations when such practices may be legitimate.85  Actions 
taken against B2B’s for alleged exclusionary tactics in violation 
of the Collaboration Guidelines risk stifling the innovation and 
experimentation necessary to develop successful B2B business 
models.86  In light of the current scarcity of exclusionary 
practices, the possible benefits of such practices in certain 
 
 83. See Steven J. Kafka, Testimony to the FTC Workshop (declaring that 
“for buyers, the credibility of the offer is absolutely an issue in who’s making 
the offer . . . is the product that they’re offering what they say it is, are they 
going to deliver it when they say they will, et cetera.”). 
 84. Such arrangements are already becoming commonplace.  See 
Seminerio, supra note 13.  Additional reasons for forming such exchanges are 
that dealing with and analyzing a large number of bids can be costly and time-
consuming.  See id.  Some firms also fear the possibility of data security 
problems in posting information on a public exchange.  See id. 
 85. See Hal Loevy, Testimony to the FTC Workshop 304 (visited April 9, 
2001) <http://www.ftc.gov>.  Mr. Loevy stated that: 
If there are 700 [B2B] marketplaces in the world today, 
we’ve talked to some 200, 250 of them, and I can only recall 
two or three cases where those marketplaces were requiring 
exclusivity. And I know of two of them at least that don’t 
exist anymore.  So, I couldn’t agree more that the 
exclusivity—the exclusivity is something which won’t exist, 
which will not allow a marketplace to carry forward.  See id. 
 86. Evidence has already accrued indicating that the mere possibility of 
FTC investigations of B2B exchanges has a chilling effect on their formation.  
Recently, the FTC investigation into an exchange created by major 
automakers caused parts suppliers interested in joining the exchange to put 
their plans on hold.  See Erich Luening, Investigation of Auto Marketplaces 
Scares Off Some Players  (May 4, 2000). 
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circumstances, and the danger of over-regulating a fragile, 
developing business model, the FTC’s adherence to already-
existing antitrust guidelines, as opposed to the promulgation of 
additional regulations aimed at B2B exchanges, represents the 
proper approach to the exclusionary practice issue. 
Nevertheless, even if B2B’s show little evidence of 
practicing exclusionary tactics in terms of admission of 
members, there are indications that some B2B’s owned by large 
players in a given industry are practicing a different type of 
exclusion: exercising their power to drive competitors out of 
business by restricting the ability of their participants to 
transact with competing exchanges.87  It is imperative that the 
FTC monitors such developments to ensure that such activities 
do not run afoul of the antitrust laws. 
At the present time, however, it appears that the current 
regulatory framework is sufficient to address this type of 
exclusion problem.  Under the last step of the rule of reason 
approach, taken only after it is determined that 
anticompetitive effects are existent, it is determined whether 
the agreement or requirement in question is “necessary to 
achieve procompetitive benefits that likely would offset 
anticompetitive harm."88  Under this step, the FTC must find 
that the limitations on participants’ abilities to transact outside 
of the exchange produce sufficiently procompetitive results.  
The B2B could satisfy this requirement, for example, by 
showing that due to the economics of the market, it needs the 
restrictions to ensure that it obtains sufficient revenue to 
operate.  The FTC should make it clear that if this final step of 
the rule of reason analysis is reached, the B2B will bear the 
burden of making such a showing. 
 
 87. See supra notes Julia King, Some Dispute FTC Finding In B2B 
Antitrust Report, COMPUTER WORLD, Nov. 6, 2000 
<http://www.computerworld.com/cwi/story/0,1199,NAV65-665_STO53357,00. 
html> (quoting Ravi Kalakota, chairman of Hsupply.com, an independent 
exchange serving the hospitality industry, as saying, “I don’t know what the 
FTC was smoking, but they’re not looking at the evidence” and claiming that 
he knows multiple hotel operators who are barred from dealing with his 
exchange under franchise agreements with large hotel companies such as 
Hyatt Corporation and Marriott International, Incorporated, both of whom are 
partners in a competing exchange, Avendra).  Hsupply.com is now defunct, yet 
another victim of the dearth of investor interest in providing further capital to 
Internet firms.  See Mark Haley, The Rise and Fall of Hsupply.com, 
HOSPITALITY UPGRADE (Spring 2001) <http://www.hotel-online.com/ 
Neo?News?PR2001_2nd?Apr01_hsupplyFall.html>. 
 88. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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C.  PREVENTING PRICE FIXING 
 
In the face of concerns about price fixing on B2B exchanges 
caused by the free flow of information among buyers and 
sellers, the Competition Policy Report cautions that whether an 
information-sharing agreement is likely to harm competition 
depends on facts unique to each situation.89  The Report then 
proceeds to put forth an analysis of such agreements which 
adheres closely to principles previously stated in the 
Collaboration Guidelines.90  The Report states five factors for 
consideration in evaluating the flow of information on B2B 
exchanges to determine the likelihood of anticompetitive 
effects. 
First, the Report inquires about the structure of the 
market the B2B serves, noting that the more concentration 
present in the market, the greater chance for an adverse 
impact on competition.91  Second, the Report states that 
information shared among competitors may cause greater 
concern than information shared with non-competitors.92  
Third, the Report quotes from the Collaboration Guidelines in 
stating that “[o]ther things being equal, the sharing of 
information relating to price, output, costs, or strategic 
planning is more likely to raise competitive concern than the 
sharing of information relating to less competitively sensitive 
variables."93  Fourth, the Report states that the sharing of 
future pricing information is greater cause for concern than 
sharing data about old transactions.94  Finally, the Report 
declares that if the shared information is available elsewhere 
besides on the B2B exchange, less concern exists about 
antitrust violations.95 
Proceeding again under traditional rule of reason analysis, 
the Report states that if likely anticompetitive effects are 
found, the investigation should then shift to an examination of 
the efficiencies which would result from the information 
sharing practice, and, finally, whether or not practical, 
 
 89. See Entering the 21st Century, supra note 9, at § 3, at 7. 
 90. See supra note 9, at 7-13. 
 91. See supra note 9, at 7. 
 92. See supra note 9, at 8. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See supra note 9, at 8-9. 
 95. See supra note 9, at 5-6. 
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significantly less restrictive alternatives exist which would 
achieve the same efficiencies.96 
The Competition Policy Report’s recitation of these factors, 
however, raises troubling questions about the relevancy of 
these existing antitrust policies to electronic transactions, 
particularly those taking place on B2B exchanges.  In 
particular, the five-factor analysis appears to be of limited 
usefulness in analyzing certain types of B2B exchanges.  By the 
very nature of a transparent B2B exchange, current, and 
perhaps even real time information, concerning sensitive 
variables such as prices and costs will be shared among 
competitors.97  Thus, the second, third, and fourth factors may 
be present in any B2B exchange in which participants can view 
each other’s current prices and offers to buy.  Moreover, the 
first factor, which looks unfavorably upon a high degree of 
market concentration in a given exchange, could have a chilling 
effect on the industry, since such concentration may be 
essential to achieve the critical mass necessary to operate a 
B2B exchange,98 as discussed in Part III, Section A of this Note.  
The five-factor analysis, therefore, may be of little help in 
distinguishing which transparent B2B’s are engaging in 
anticompetitive practices. 
Just as importantly, the FTC’s Rule of Reason approach is 
applied to collaborations between competitors which may have 
anticompetitive effects.99  A B2B exchange in which buyers and 
sellers have immediate, transparent access to bids, sales, and 
prices, however, represents a state of “rapid information 
exchange” under which tacit collusion on pricing can take place 
without any evidence left behind of an actual collaboration.100  
For example, under conditions of rapid information exchange, a 
seller’s incentive to deviate from a price may be significantly 
reduced.101  A seller’s intent in cutting prices is the desire to 
 
 96. See id. 
 97. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text. 
 98. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 99. See supra notes 26-43 and accompanying text. 
 100. The rapidity with which information can be exchanged on a B2B 
marketplace makes it much easier for sellers to monitor each other’s prices.  
As an analogy, consider the ease with which online retailers today can monitor 
the prices of their competitors.  It has been noted that online merchants are 
closely monitoring each other’s prices since the best prices of popular items, 
such as books, are usually within a few cents of each other.  See Hal R. Varian, 
Online Commerce Creates Strange Competition, N.Y. TIMES, August 24, 2000. 
 101. See Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Horizontal Price Fixing in the 
Electronic Marketplace, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1996). 
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reap increased sales from the lower price.102  If competitors on 
the B2B exchange can immediately detect and match the 
reduction in price, however, the seller who first cuts prices will 
gain only a fraction of any increase in purchases caused by the 
lower selling price.103  Thus, a seller may have little incentive to 
cut prices in the first place.104  Therefore, market transparency 
can actually facilitate above-market pricing. 105 In the absence 
of rapid information exchange, maintaining coordinated pricing 
is more difficult, because a seller can never be certain that a 
competitor is not breaking the price-fixing agreement by 
engaging in secret price cuts.106 
The current collaboration antitrust guidelines which the 
FTC intends to apply to B2B exchanges do not adequately 
address this phenomenon.  Mere “follow the leader” behavior, 
in which no seller is willing to cut prices unless another seller 
does so first, is not illegal as long as there is no actual 
agreement, tacit or otherwise, to fix prices, even if the result is 
supracompetitive pricing.107  In employing the rule of reason 
analysis, courts and the FTC do not assume that mere price 
matching constitutes an agreement to fix prices.  Rather, they 
look for additional factors which would support an inference 
that an agreement to fix prices exists among competitors.108  To 
do otherwise could subject a competitor to the rule of reason 
analysis any time it attempted to compete with another 
 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id. 
 106. In Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast-Iron Soil Pipe Inst., the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals stated that: 
The problem [for a firm participating in a price-fixing 
agreement] is that each also knows that for it alone the best 
of all possible worlds is to attract customers through a small 
price cut not matched by others.  Since they all know this, 
how can they keep each other from cutting prices?  How can 
they prevent the forces of competition from breaking out, 
with one or another firm yielding to the temptation to cut 
its own prices while hoping the others will not match the 
low price?  . . . [e]ach fears that . . . its competitors will  
“chisel” on the tacit pricing arrangement, perhaps through 
secret or selective price cut. 
Clamp-All Corp v. Cast-Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484-85 (1st Cir. 
1988). 
 107. See Baker, supra note 97. 
 108. See id. 
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competitor by matching a reduction in price.109 
In the airlines-price fixing case,110 the government was able 
to detect evidence of an agreement to fix the prices of air fares 
because the data attached to those fares on the computer 
reservation system allowed airlines to test in advance whether 
or not other airlines would go along with a proposed fare 
hike.111  The complex behavior that resulted from this practice 
produced a strong inference that tacit price-fixing agreements 
were taking place.112 
Most B2B exchanges, however, do not provide mechanisms 
through which buyers and sellers can signal each other about 
future proposed price changes.113  While this may make it more 
difficult for price coordination to occur, it can also make it far 
more difficult for the government to produce an inference that 
such price coordination is occurring, since there is no explicit 
signaling mechanism for the FTC to detect. Therefore, the 
current rule of reason analysis, which requires at least enough 
evidence to produce an inference of an agreement between 
buyers or sellers to raise prices in order to suggest unlawful 
activity is occurring,114 may be wholly inadequate at policing 
those B2B exchanges which provide transparent market 
information to its participants. 
The primary difficulty in policing potential price-fixing 
agreements in the B2B industry, as elsewhere, will likely 
involve cases lacking an express agreement.  It can be very 
difficult to distinguish between an implicit price-fixing 
agreement and simple competitive behavior.115  The highest 
potential for abuse occurs in those B2B exchanges in which 
participants have real-time access to each other’s bids and 
prices.116 
Some proponents of B2B exchanges assert that these 
marketplaces already have strong incentives to organize their 
operations in such a way as to avoid anticompetitive 
 
 109. See id. 
 110. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See Comments of the American Antitrust Institute Relating to Orbitz 
and the D.O.T.’s C.R.S. Rulemaking, 14 (Sept. 18, 2000) 
<http://www.antitrustinstitute.org>. 
 113. See Charles F. Rule, et al., B2B or Collusion, LEGAL TIMES 36 (April 3, 
2000). 
 114. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text. 
 115. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text. 
 116. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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information-sharing practices.117  However true that may be, 
the facts of the airline price-fixing case demonstrate that, given 
the ability to engage in subtle price signaling measures, 
unlawful anticompetitive behavior will sometimes occur.118  
Therefore, while a hands-off approach to regulation of B2B’s 
may produce adequate results in most cases due to market 
forces that require B2B’s to engage in fair practices in order to 
attract members, it is likely that some abuses will occur. 119  
Furthermore, the alleged case of spread-fixing on NASDAQ 
provides evidence that price collusion may occur even in real-
time markets where no information on future pricing can be 
exchanged.120  It is paramount, therefore, that the FTC consider 
new approaches to regulate information exchange on B2B 
marketplaces. 
The most commonly suggested solution to the problem of 
price collusion consists of restrictions on the amount of 
information that buyers and sellers are allowed to share on the 
exchange.121  Generally, these restrictions involve creating a 
“vertical path” within the exchange, protected by firewalls 
within the software driving the exchange.122  Vertical paths only 
allow a purchaser to see the bids which it has made, and not 
the bids of other buyers.123  Likewise, a seller only sees the 
prices that a buyer is willing to pay for its goods, and not the 
 
 117. See, e.g., Jasinowski, supra note 13 (asserting that B2B exchanges will 
enhance rather than restrict competition, even without government 
regulation); Edward Correia, Testimony to the FTC Workshop 502 (visited 
April 9, 2001) <http://www.ftc.gov> (stating that “[w]hen rivals are putting 
prices out for basically instantaneous transactions, I think it might be very 
hard to imagine a very effective way to collude” because with real-time 
transactions, there is no opportunity to signal future contingent prices to 
competitors). 
 118. See Baker, supra note 97.  Baker argues that additional evidence 
shows that given the opportunity, price fixing will occur.  See id.  Baker cites 
contemporary economic “game” theory which shows the plausibility of price 
coordination among competitors, even in the absence of an agreement which 
would render it unlawful under current antitrust laws.  See id. 
 119. Likewise, while voluntary disclosure laws in the securities industry 
may produce optimal results in many cases the well established evidence of 
fraud in the securities markets prior to the enactment of disclosure laws 
demonstrates that given the opportunity for abuse, some abuse will likely 
occur.  See supra note 64.  See also Seligman, The Historical Need for a 
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 120. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 121. See, e.g., The Original Equipment Suppliers Association, supra note 
58. 
 122. See id. at 5. 
 123. See id. 
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prices at which other sellers are willing to sell.124 
In many cases, the buyers and sellers on a B2B exchange 
already demand a certain degree of data confidentiality to 
protect their proprietary information.125  Such restrictions on 
information sharing, however, tend to negate some of the 
possible benefits of participation in a B2B exchange.  Having 
access to the identity of other buyers and sellers, as well as the 
prices of purchased goods and their quantities, allows a 
participant to get an idea of overall trends within the market.  
The discernment of such trends can help an exchange 
participant manage its inventory levels, reducing the chance of 
it being caught with too much inventory or too little input 
supplies, therefore smoothing out the overall business cycle in 
the industry.126  Some exchange participants, therefore, are 
likely to desire access to some degree of information about 
other participants on the exchange.127  Even in those cases 
where B2B participants do not desire information-sharing to 
occur, a situation could arise in which a large B2B dominates a 
given industry, and entities in the field may have no choice but 
to join the exchange and play by its rules. 
A first possible solution to protect against price collusion 
while maintaining the ability to share a limited amount of 
information is to require the anonymization of the data.128  As 
 
 124. See id. 
 125. See Charles Phillips, Statements to the FTC Workshop stating that 
my experience has been that the buyers and the 
suppliers are definitely afraid of anybody seeing 
anything else.  They want these relationships to 
remain private with a portion of the marketplace 
public for people who want to do that, for suppliers 
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publish a generic price for everyone to see.  That 
may be a different price than they’ve negotiated for a 
supplier . . . 
Id.  Phillips also points out that the potential for price fixing through exchange 
of information only exists in those B2B exchanges which utilize a real-time 
pricing format.  See id. at 300.  In fact, however, many B2B exchanges only 
offer a static pricing format in which buyers select items from posted catalogs.  
See id.  The catalogs may even be segmented such that a seller only allows 
portions of the catalog to be available to purchasers who satisfy certain 
criteria.  See id. 
 126. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 127. See e.g., Comments of energyLeader.com to the FTC Workshop 11, 14 
(June 2000) (stating that exchanges set up by energyLeader.com typically do 
not allow buyers to learn about each others’ purchases, but may let sellers 
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 128. See The Original Equipment Suppliers Association, supra note 58. 
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long as the number of participants is large enough, information 
concerning each bid for a good can be distributed to each 
participant while making it difficult for any participant to 
accurately attribute any specific transaction data to any 
specific participant.129  Alternatively, the bid information can be 
provided only in the aggregate.  The total quantity of goods 
purchased and the average price for a good over a given period 
of time can be distributed, but not information pertaining to 
any specific transaction.130 
The potential anticompetitive risks of information sharing 
are enhanced when there is an asymmetry of information 
among the participants on an exchange.131  A B2B exchange 
owned only by sellers or solely by buyers creates a situation in 
which the owners, who necessarily have access to all 
information being transferred on its exchange, have an 
incentive to utilize their privileged position to the detriment of 
non-owners.132 
Some B2B participants suggest that exchanges owned by 
firms on the seller level rather than the buyer level are less 
likely to raise antitrust concerns; a buyer-owned exchange may 
feel more pressure to take advantage of inside information on 
competitors, because one of the buyers’ primary aims is to 
reduce the price at which it purchases goods from sellers.133  
From the perspective of the seller’s side, however, the primary 
motivation in joining a B2B exchange is to develop a channel of 
distributors and buyers to purchase its goods.134  Thus, some 
argue that a seller-led exchange would be “more in favor of 
supporting an entire value chain"135 as opposed to favoring 
sellers over buyers. 
Buyer participants in B2B exchanges, however, often argue 
that seller-owned exchanges pose the greatest risk of price 
fixing activities.  A seller-owned exchange could use its access 
to exchange data to discover the purchasing needs of buyers in 
advance and raise prices accordingly.136  A second solution, 
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 132. See id. at 5. 
 133. See Dwayne Spradlin, Testimony to the FTC Workshop 
 (June 29, 2000). 
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 136. See Kaushik Shridharani, Statement to the FTC Workshop 185 (June 
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therefore, would be a regulation requiring an independent third 
party to own B2B exchanges, which would minimize the danger 
of owner favoritism.137 
Both of these solutions, however, may compromise the 
formation of B2B exchanges and the level of efficiencies needed 
to operate them.  Numerous situations may exist in which a 
seller-owned exchange or an independently owned exchange is 
the most plausible or efficient way to organize a given B2B.  
Consider, for example, that B2B’s require an enormous amount 
of money and resources to commence operation.138  Having a 
B2B started and supported by players in the industry can 
provide these resources, while an independent, third-party B2B 
exchange may have to seek outside financing to operate.139  
Furthermore, in the recent market climate, in which Internet 
start-ups are having serious difficulties obtaining venture 
capital financing or completing initial public offerings (IPOs),140 
any regulation restricting who may have equity stakes in B2B 
exchanges may prevent an exchange from being created.  Such 
a regulation would be especially inappropriate in the context of 
a new and hyper-innovative industry such as B2B exchanges, 
which are attempting to develop never before seen platforms, 
and consequently require flexibility to determine which type of 
business model is most efficient and effective.  It would be 
extremely difficult at this time for the FTC to interfere with an 
industry for which the rules are still being written, and 
effectively weigh the pros and cons of various B2B ownership 
 
2000) (arguing that in supplier-owned exchanges,  
traditional firewall mechanisms are likely to be particularly ineffective 
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Nevertheless, the traditional antitrust analysis which the 
FTC is currently employing in relation to B2B exchanges does 
not adequately address the potential anticompetitive risks 
involved in the sharing of information on these exchanges, 
particularly those exchanges involving real-time pricing and 
owned by a small group on the seller side.  In light of the 
dangers of placing restrictions on who may own and operate 
B2B exchanges, a nuanced approach is called for which 
balances the benefits of market transparency with its 
associated antitrust concerns. 
The FTC, therefore, should move to enact regulations 
requiring the identity of all buyers and sellers in a B2B 
employing real-time pricing to remain anonymous.  In both the 
airline price-fixing case and the NASDAQ spread-fixing case, 
the defendants could determine the identities of all other 
participants in the electronic market and so were allegedly able 
to punish those who deviated from the implicit collusive 
agreement.  Requiring such anonymity, therefore, would make 
it significantly more difficult for a price-fixing agreement to be 
enforced. 
Second, the FTC should enact a regulation prohibiting 
owners of non-independent exchanges from utilizing 
confidential information which it receives in their capacity as 
owners in a way that is detrimental to other participants on the 
exchange.  A B2B could meet this requirement, for example, by 
establishing firewalls between the owner’s computer systems 
and those of the exchange.  While responsible B2B’s will likely 
already implement such procedures, this regulation will ensure 
protection in any case in which a B2B is controlled by entities 
which dominate in a given market, and could otherwise impose 
anticompetitive information-sharing practices to the detriment 
of other B2B participants. 
These proposed regulations simply represent good faith 
practices that should be relatively unburdensome to 
implement, and help to provide needed protection without 
imposing more substantive regulations which could cripple the 
development of this already fragile industry. 
 
 
 141. See Arthur B. Scullery & W. William A. Woods, Comments to the FTC 
Workshop 3 (visited April 9, 2001) <http://www.ftc.gov> (stating that “[i]n our 
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In light of the need for B2B’s to have flexibility in 
designing the most efficient and effective marketplaces, it 
would be unwise for the FTC to rush in and begin regulation of 
the ownership structures of B2B’s at this time.  This is 
especially so since the FTC has little precedent to rely on in 
establishing what is and is not anti-competitive behavior in the 
B2B world.  Since the types of risks found in the B2B world are 
similar to those that are found in other joint collaborations 
between competitors, the FTC’s Collaborator Guidelines may 
ultimately serve as an effective starting point for dealing with 
B2B’s.  Evidence suggests, however, that current antitrust laws 
cannot adequately address the anticompetitive risks which may 
arise from the sharing of real-time pricing information between 
buyers and sellers on a B2B exchange.  Hence, the FTC should 
encourage B2B exchanges to consider such approaches as 
establishing independent boards to establish admission 
standards to the exchange, and anonymizing all customer 
identity data in exchanges involving real-time pricing of goods, 
to reduce the risks of tacit price coordination which may be 
nearly impossible to prove otherwise.  It is important in any 
case, however, that the FTC wait for the “dust to settle,” so to 
speak, before embarking on any major, additional regulation of 
the B2B’s which could discourage innovation and eliminate the 
promised benefits of these exchanges before they even have the 
opportunity to be recognized.  Fortunately, the FTC seems to be 
aware of its present limitations, and is proceeding cautiously.142  
Hopefully, the FTC will be able to develop an approach in due 
time which appropriately balances the risks and opportunities 
of these remarkable entities. 
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